

Working Paper
in Economics and
Development Studies



Department of Economics
Padjadjaran University

No. 200803

**“Street Vendors :
Urban Problem and
Economic Potential”**

Harlan Dimas

Department of Economics,
Padjadjaran University

June, 2008

Center for Economics and Development Studies,
Department of Economics, Padjadjaran University
Jalan Cimandiri no. 6, Bandung, Indonesia.

Phone/Fax: +62-22-4204510

<http://www.lp3e-unpad.org>

For more titles on this series, visit:

<http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/unpwpaper/>

**Paper prepared for presentation at the First Indonesian Regional Science Association -
International Institute (1st IRSA-II)
Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB)
November 1-3, 2007, Bandung, West Java, Indonesia**

ABSTRACT

“Street Vendors : Urban Problem and Economic Potential”

Harlan Dimas

ESP FE UNPAD Bandung

Of the many trials faced by city managers in developing countries, one of the most challenging is undoubtedly the Street Vendors (SV) problem. They are a perpetual problem for street and sidewalk users in most Indonesian cities. Their spill-over business onto roadways is the source of traffic congestion. Their informal setting and business refuse (garbage) cause unsightly urban vista. However there is now a gradual shift of perspectives that focus on their economic potentials, offering a smart city manager a host of development opportunities. Hence the current policy of harassment and elimination of SV, as practiced by most municipalities in Indonesia, is counter productive at best and inhuman at worst.

This paper discusses the roots of the SV phenomenon (found to be mostly economics) and suggests several SV management solutions sampled from best practices from around the world.

Keywords : Street Vendors Management, Economic Policy, Best Practices, Local (Urban)
Economic Development

JEL Classification : P25

“Street Vendors : Urban Problem and Economic Potential”*

I. Introduction

1.1 Street Vending Nomenclature

In Indonesia Street Vendors or Hawkers are termed **Pedagang Kaki Lima (PKL)**. It is a term derived from an old Dutch rule on the provision of pavement/sidewalk in front of shops to ensure safe and convenient space for pedestrian traffic. The minimum width was five feet (Lima Kaki). Hence in Indonesia hawkers or street sellers who occupy this area are called Pedagang Kaki Lima (Amir Sidharta, Kompas, 8/2/06). **Street Vendors (SV)** is further divided into **mobile/dynamic**, those who visit different streets/ places during their working hours, and **immobile/static SV**, those that stay on-site, having a regular/home-base (Bhowmik, 2002). Mobile SV is further divided into **fully mobile SV**, the ones that keep on moving, and **partially mobile SV**, the ones that have several rest/stop locations. An illustration of the latter is some sellers who sell in front of schools early in the morning (school children arrive, school about to start) and return there twice later in the morning and in the afternoon (school children having recess and children released from school, school is over). Between those times the sellers visit or relocate in other places where customers are plenty, such as markets, residential areas, office complex, etc. Static SV at the minimum have a piece of cloth or plastic mat thrown on the ground to display their wares (short-term markets/”pasar kaget”), but usually they grow into some semi-permanent structure to accommodate their business. A common site is the “plastic blue tent” over (long) wood benches and/or plastic stools (Setianto, 2007). Dynamic SV normally push carts or carry their wares on their shoulders (“ditanggung”). According to Bhowmik (2002), women SV in India prefer to be fully dynamic, never stop or rest too long at any one place, to avoid thugs and/or harassments.

(See appendices for photographs of different street vendors)

* Library research assistance provided by Sinta Wulansari, SE

Although most SV are independent sellers, during these times of economic hardship in Indonesia, some are found to be extensions (subsidiaries) of regular stores. This is the stores attempt to compete with the regular SV. In a minority of the cases some “successful” SV may branch out into possession of several other SV outlets (Susanti, 2007).

1.2 Street Vendors as an Urban Management Challenge

Most people hold negative images of SV/PKL. This is true for the whole world, not confined only to Indonesians. Pedestrians are annoyed by their encroachment of sidewalks. At some places it is difficult to walk straight. People then will have to pass the narrow aisles between seller stalls walking sideways. When the sidewalks are too crowded people are forced to step onto the road to walk, which is a very dangerous exercise. Drivers and other road users dislike them for their road encroachment. For instance, the two-way traffic on four lanes of Oto Iskandar Dinata street, in front of Pasar Baru (New Market) in Bandung, was reduced to one lane, forcing unidirectional traffic. In some cases road encroachment is such that for practical purposes traffic ceased, such as at ‘pasar kaget’ (surprise market) Gasibu, Bandung. Store-owners despise the PKL for their illegal use of the shops’ front sidewalks, which the PKL then modify to suit their own needs. This modification often involves semi permanent roof to protect their wares from the sun and rain (usually in the form of blue/industrial plastic tents), which obstructs sun light from shining on the stores and hampers the flow of fresh air. All this robs the sidewalk of its convenience and deters walking traffic into the stores, hence reducing the stores’ business. Furthermore, in a minority of cases where the PKL are selling similar goods to the shops, then the shops’ business are directly threatened. The latter is mostly true for sellers located in (Indonesian) traditional markets (as opposed to western style super markets). They view PKL as direct competitors and unfair competitors at that, since PKL steal their customers out in front, before the customers enter the market. In fact PKL oppose other PKL, rejecting government attempts to relocate them unless other PKL were also relocated simultaneously. Otherwise they would lose business to new PKL occupying the newly vacated spaces. (Bandung.go.id, 7/13/07).

With so much antagonism directed at them, it is no wonder that SV/PKL is seen as an urban scourge the world over (ILO, 2006). City managers would like to eliminate them, since they deface city sights. SV are dirty, congestive, chaotic and uncontrollable. They are unwanted

elements in a carefully laid urban architecture. Hence municipal governments, both here in Indonesia and abroad, in most developing countries, regularly apply police powers to eliminate them. These 'street sweepings' ("razzia"), to clean them off SV, were usually popular, broadly supported by the people. Even if the support was not overwhelming, since road users were represented by private car owners, they have more political clout than SV, by virtue of being economically stronger. Although SV are regularly "taxed" by different parties (thugs and officials) to pay for protection or avoidance of harassment, almost none of this money ever reaches the municipal treasury. Thus SV have no significant direct economic benefit for the municipality. This is another reason for their harsh treatment by city managers.

In Indonesia street sweepings are done by the **Administrative Enforcement Police (Satpol PP or Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja**, as opposed to the regular police, who direct traffic and catch criminals). They mount surprise operations, catching the PKL and their wares. The wares were either destroyed on-site or confiscated, to be returned after fines were paid, or to be destroyed later, if the owners lack funds to pay the fines. The captured PKL were usually released after a quick "advice" session (encouragement for relocation), or held for a short period. The municipal government is not in a position (financially) to keep a lot of people in jails. Still, many PKL preferred to run when faced with a street sweeping operation. So, we sometimes saw some policemen chasing PKL on the streets. These hot pursuits often ended up with bad air. The tired policemen became short-tempered, especially if the PKL offered verbal and/or physical resistance to the destruction of their properties. Sometimes violence erupted to the detriment of all parties concerned.

Regular sweeping operations breed antagonism among the PKL. This is reasonable in light of property seizure and/or destruction. Some times PKL organized themselves to repel the sweeps and some sweeps were cancelled due to the violent resistance. However the municipal government would comeback later with stronger force and the PKL were swept off the streets and sidewalks, for the time being. They always returned and the Admin Police (Satpol PP) would have to mount another sweep. It is safe to assume that this harassment policy to deal with PKL is counterproductive, not to say inhuman. PKL are not the only victim in the sweeping process. The Admin Police personnel suffered also. They were ordered to perform a task that is against human decency, that is harassing PKL who are not really criminals. They knew that the PKL were only trying to survive. They realize that the PKL were simply attempting to feed their families. The accumulated effects of constant sweeping operations, more so if many ended in violence, will

either breed brutality among the Admin Police personnel or make them feel alienated. Thus over time it looks as if this harassment tactics is a no win (or lose-lose) policy.

II. The Causes Behind Street Vending

Why do we have SV/PKL ? The dominant answer is simple economics. Assuming that sellers prefer to be legitimate traders, then SV/PKL is a last resort. They exist because of the desperation of demand and supply. On the demand side SV serve the need of their consumers, mostly the poor (Bodhikong & Moongjongklang, 2004). PKL do not force people to buy. People decide to buy at SV, because it is rational. SV offer low price goods sold at razor thin profit margin. In some sense they subsidize their customers, by working long hours supported by unpaid labor, usually family members (Nirathron, 2006). Hence street sweepings will only eliminate them temporarily. Similar to drugs, alcohol and pornography, as long as the demand remains, so shall SV. They will return, sooner rather than later. Thus repressive measures are deemed counter productive : lots of casualties on both sides for no apparent gain.

On the supply side the discussion on the root causes of SV must be placed in the context of the **informal sector economics**. As discussed in most economics textbooks, the informal sector is part of the economy that operates beyond the rules and regulations that govern the formal sector (ILO, 1972; Todaro, 2005). Its size is astonishingly significant in most developing countries, although it rarely receives the attention that it deserves. It functions as a vessel to accommodate labor unemployed, for various reasons, in the formal sector. The formal sector more often than not is represented by relatively modern, high tech, urban employment. It offers higher salary than the traditional rural employment. Thus cities become magnets that attract rural labor. Unfortunately for most of the migrating rural (agriculture) workers they do not possess the skills demanded by modern occupations. Hence they are not employable in the formal sector. To survive they have no recourse except creating employment using their only asset, themselves. They mostly cater to the needs of people just above them in the urban social rung (the poor relying on the less poor). These customers are themselves hanging precariously to their jobs, on the bottom of the economic ladder, barely surviving on the fringes of the urban formal sector. They, in turn, cater to the needs of the “real” urbanites, those sufficiently fortunate to possess the necessary skills required by the modern economy. This last group of people, amazingly, may

have a living standard comparable to their counterparts in developed countries. (We are forcefully reminded to Boeke's dualistic economy thesis). When the words "global economy" are bandied about, this is the image that world leaders try to project.

Another major cause for rural-urban migration of labor is surplus labor in the rural agriculture sector. Land does not expand, while population keeps on growing. Thus over time there is insufficient agricultural land to accommodate all of the rural labor. Also, with technological progress less labor can manage the land efficiently and produce even more. So, more and more rural labor is crowded out of the agriculture sector. They have no place to go but to the cities, hoping to improve their lots. Thus the third world phenomenon of over-urbanization started, where urban infrastructures are stretched to the limits. Cities become crowded with unrelenting traffic jams, public spaces are overtaken by squatters, municipalities can no longer provide adequate amount of clean water, public schools are overloaded, crime rate increases, the air is polluted, and rivers are contaminated. People see the informal sector growing rapidly, street vendors encroach first the sidewalks, then the roads. On top of the growing number of vehicles, on already minimum amount of roads, this encroachment becomes unbearable. So, the people demand street sweeping of SV and the local governments simply comply.

The newest contributor to the informal sector labor is – surprise ! – the global economy. This is the negative image that globalization leaders prefer not to underscore. Facing tough import competition domestic firms cut costs any way they can. The easiest is by outsourcing, contracting some of the work to the informal sector (ILO, 2005). The informal sector operates with cheaper labor, due to the nonexistent labor protection : no legal contract (casual work arrangement), no minimum wage, no health insurance, no unemployment insurance, no work safety standards, can hire children. What happens to the displaced "formal sector" worker whose jobs are now outsourced ? Many of them have no choice except to enter the informal sector. In fact, a significant proportion of the street vendors in several economic researches in Asia and Latin America used to be employed in the formal sector (Bhowmik, 2003; ILO, 2005 & 2006).

Specifically for Indonesia there is one more reason for the burgeoning of the informal sector and , by turn, the inflating numbers of SV in the cities : the unending economic crisis. As we can see from national statistics, since 1997 the rate of unemployment has been increasing. Starting at 4.7 % (4,197,000 persons) in 1997, it was 10.3 % (10,854,000 persons) in 2005.

(See appendices for data statistics on unemployment, poverty and income per capita)

The proportion of the population currently living under the povertyline has also increased relative to the early 1990's. Then it was in the 13-14 % range (about 26 million people). After 1997/8 economic and political crisis it was in the 17-18% range (around 36 million people). It also bears to mind that the BPS method to calculate povertyline (and unemployment) has been criticized as being a bit too politicized (underestimates). The byword today is “decoupling”, where recovery in the financial sector is not accompanied by similar recovery in the real sector (BI, 2007). As such, while some Indonesians have regained their former - precrisis - prosperity, the rate of unemployment will hardly decrease.

With such dire macroeconomics it is reasonable to expect the size of Indonesian urban informal sector to expand and the SV “problem” to grow. This is not good news for the majority of Indonesian city managers and local administrations.

III. A New Perspectives on Street Vendors

While in the beginning some economists held that economic growth will naturally reduce and finally eliminate the informal sector, based on historical evidence of developed countries, this “trickle down” view of progress has been replaced. The main-stream view now is that the informal sector in the developing world deserves direct intervention, if only that the natural process of reduction takes too much time (Todaro, 2005).

In the new economic perspectives informal sector is viewed positively, as an outlet for human creativity, as a courageous manifestation of an economy in a survival mode. Workers participation in the in this sector are now seen as heroes, surviving against the odds. They are men, women and children simply trying to feed their families to the best of their abilities. Especially apt for street vendors, they are men, women and children surviving on the tough streets, eking life on the asphalt jungle.

As such repressive urban policy seems to be the wrong tool to set on the problem, if SV is still seen as a problem.

Their heroics can be summarized as living on the edge of subsistence. According to a recent research, their profit margin is about 7-8%, but this is a gross rate, since unpaid labor of family members are not calculated in cost. The net profit margin maybe as low as 1%. Nominally this profit maybe as low as Rp 960,000/year or Rp 80,000/month (Rina Indiatuti, 2007). How can anyone survive on this ? Only the poor and the weak will opt for a live such as this. Out there on the streets, only the toughest survives.

Yet they survive, without government help. In the case of SV, despite being pursued by the Admin Police (Satpol PP) again and again, despite property seizure, despite “illegal taxes” (pungli/pungutan liar) demanded by officials and thugs (preman). They exist without legal protection whatsoever (hence the term, informal sector). Though in the morning they may have paid their daily tax, in the afternoon the Admin Police may sweep them off all the same. This happens not only in Indonesia, but all over the cities of the developing countries (Bodhikong & Moongjongklang, 2004; Nirathron, 2006; ILO, 2006).

According to the International Labor Organization (ILO, 2004), about 6 out of every 10 workers in Less Developed Countries (LDC) are absorbed by the informal sector. This magnitude makes the informal sector an important part of the aggregate economy. As such street vendors then make an important contribution to the urban economy. They should no longer be viewed simply as a nuisance to be eliminated off the city streets and sidewalks.

Just a year into the crisis, in 1999, the **small and medium sized enterprises (SME**, practically dominated by the informal sector) employed 88% of all Indonesian labor. The informal sector made up about 90% of SME, or about 40 million business units in 2004 (Mubyarto, 7/2004). The large firms, the ones with hundreds of trillion rupiahs of government credit, collapsed. With their collapse the owners ran to Singapore with the bulk of this country’s foreign exchange reserves. After so much pampering, favorable rules and regulation, and “buddy-buddy” treatment, they left Indonesia leaving foreign debt and poverty in their wake. What were left were SME and the informal sector, the indigenous economic units that grew with difficulty during the boom era of the New Order (Orba) regime, against all odds. They survived without government support (Mubyarto, 3/2004), neither credit nor regulations, but now were relied upon to fuel economic

recovery and growth. In post-crisis West Java, Indonesia, SME absorbed 99% of labor (10,481,000 persons) as compared to 1% by large firms (76,000 persons). Hence the informal sector, in this case as part of the SME, is a significant contribution to regional employment. In the same year, 2000, it was also the largest contributor to gross regional domestic product (GRDP), amounting to 53.5 %, relative to the share of large firms, 46.5 %. (Sutyastie Remi, 2003). Thus SME and the informal sector are currently the economic savior of the nation. As of the SV/PKL, a recent Jakarta research estimated that last year their contribution was around Rp 13 billion/month (Kompas, 8/13/07). The famous Sunday Morning market at the Gasibu area in Bandung is estimated to have a transaction volume of about Rp 3 billion for the half morning (Bagdja, 2007). They also pay, on average between Rp 3,000 to Rp 4,000/day for “sanitary and protection” fee, and there are thousands of SV in the city ! (There are about 3,000 PKL in the Gasibu market). Where do all this money go ? If they ever reach the city coffers it will be a significant amount. It will be a monetary manifestation of the economic potential of SV. All this information helped transform people’s perception of the informal sector and the SV. Their image is now one of a productive contributor to society, a safety valve to channel unemployed labor and a vehicle to redeem human dignity lost with the loss of jobs during this prolonged economic crisis of Indonesia.

IV. Best Practices

There is no question that for many people street vendors (SV) are a major nuisance. They obstruct foot and vehicle traffic, due to their encroachment of sidewalks/pavements and roads. They are unsightly, due to their slap-dash shelters or booths. Their booths and shelters also reduce air flow and sun rays. They are dirty and disorderly. However none of these problems defy fixing, if people really want to fix them. There are examples of well managed SV/PKL that turn them into an urban asset. They can be organized and regulated, such that they are clean and orderly. They can be a tourist attraction. They can grow, expand and gradually join the formal sector. Below are some suggestions to better manage street vendors and examples of best practices collected from around the world that can be used as policy benchmarks.

1. First and foremost is a **change of mindset**. People make and enforce policies. Without the correct attitude with respect to SV/PKL there will not be any sustained policy effort to support

PKL. Thailand (ILO, 2006) and India (ILO, 2007) are good examples of public concerted effort to support PKL. They now have a comprehensive national policy focusing on street vending (PKL). People still need to see how this policy is implemented at the local level, but at least the legal framework is already constructed.

2. Macroeconomics is a necessary factor. The conventional view of “trickle down effect” is not totally in error. With better economy the need for informal sector employment will be less and, in turn, there will be less street vendors also (both mobile and static).

3. Development economists have for some time advocated rural development to prevent rural labor migrating to urban areas. With prosperity in the villages there will be less need to search for employment in the crowded LDC cities. (Todaro, 2005). Consequently, allocating scarce capital to the cities to alleviate urban poverty will only attract more rural migration. This is a classical example of a wrong (economic) policy.

4. Monetary economics supplies a vital ingredient : microfinancing. Commercial banks have been empirically proven to be unable to support the informal sector. Thus microfinancing is born and it is hugely popular since Prof. Mohammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh were awarded the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize. The Central Bank of Indonesia has recently (2006) initiated rules to guide microfinancing institutions. Brazil has two examples of successful microfinancing institutions (ILO, 2005). The PCPP has 30,000 small business units as borrowers and the SCP has 164,000 clients. Both MFI (micro-finance institutions) are jointly funded by the public, private sector and foreign donors. The average credit is about \$2,000.

5. Microeconomics : in the end the local implementation is what counts. One of the most difficult obstacles to overcome is bureaucracy. For informal sector participants generally and street vendors specifically, the cost of bureaucracy is often too dear. They simply cannot afford to pay the price, so they never can step up to formality.

- a) In Peru, the Institute of Liberty and Democracy (ILD) managed to persuade some local governments to accelerate registration process from 300 to ONE day (!). Since 2004 267,000 micro and small business units have become formal (registered and paying taxes). Due to the increase in tax revenue municipalities now realize the economic value of the informal sector. Prior to becoming formal these SME were illegally taxed and the

money never reached the public purse. This is one reason for much of the repressive urban measures on street vendors : unrealized economic potential. (ILO, 2005)

- b) In Lima, Peru, PROMDE (Defenders of Small Business Rights) helped the local administration to reduce registration steps from 45 to 12. Thus reducing the processing days from 70 to 1 (!). The number of registered SME has increased, from a stable number for several years of 1,100 in 1998 to 4,000 in 2000. (ILO, 2005)
- c) There are also good examples of SV/PKL management in several cities in Indonesia. The municipal administration of Jombang (Rojiful Mamduh 8/6/07), Padang and Solo (Kompas, 6/8/07) are known for good effort on behalf of the PKL, although the road to success is still full of holes. For these three cities order and timing are the keys to good PKL management. The street vendors were provided standardized carts. The size of their lots was also standardized. These create uniformity and order. The carts were then wheeled in and out at certain times. Roads were closed (off peak hours) and then reopened (peak hours) at certain times. During off operation periods the carts were neatly stored somewhere unobtrusive, thus the cities stay clean and the roads incongested. Although Bandung in general is not known for its order nor cleanliness (regardless of the city motto of “Bermartabat”), the PKL center around Cilaki and Citarum streets is well managed (Pikiran Rakyat, 11/4/02). It is successful, because the local government provides them with a room to trade and they, through their association of street vendors, police themselves, to maintain sanitation (a difficult undertaking) and to prevent new vendors from locating in the area (an even more difficult proposition). The latter is necessary to prevent congestion, which may force the government – by popular demand - to evict all of them. Other well ordered PKL centers in Bandung are around Cihapit street (electronics, sports goods and other used merchandise) and Cikapundung Barat (new discounted magazine and books). In Surabaya the PKL around Masjid Sunan Ampel is also well ordered. It is a pleasure walking and shopping there. The goods offered remind visitors of the exotic Middle East. Also well managed are the street vendors around the Alun-alun (central city park) of Yogyakarta and Surakarta. Both are magnets for tourists. (Amir Sidharta, 2006).

6. The architecture variable : a large portion of street vendors were originally legitimate sellers with market stalls. However, when their traditional market (“pasar becek”) was renovated the new market went up in quality and the stalls were too expensive for them to rent (Bandung.go.id 7/13/07). The developers seek a high return on their investment and the normal

way was to increase rent. Rent increase was only justifiable with higher building quality. So, the traditional market is now a “mall” and the original tenants are forced out onto the pavements or sidewalks and the streets. Perhaps it is not too hard to construct simple floor plans for some of the new market floors, so that the poorer original tenants can still afford the space. A cross-subsidy scheme may be designed, financed either by the higher quality floors or by the government, or both. On top of that micro-financing may help the poorer renters to pay for their lots.

An innovative financing scheme was recently introduced in the spirit of Social Business (Yunus, 2006). Paying monthly installments, a huge sum paid on the first of the month, is infeasible for SV aspiring to locate in formal markets. In the new micro-finance market-scheme the market (building) developer allows SV to pay a small amount daily. This is what they are used to do on the street (“protection money”) and this is something they are able to do. The administrative cost (collecting small amounts from many sellers/stall tenants) of this financing scheme may be close to prohibitive, but Bank Pasar (“Market Bank”, now BPD/Bank Pembangunan Daerah – Regional Development Bank) and the Grameen Bank (in Bangladesh) have been doing it successfully for many years. So, it can be done. We need more creative economic-architecture ideas such as this.

7. A contribution of urban architecture (city planning) : when urban architectural trend is toward minimizing private space and maximizing public space, as dictated by the steep increase of city land prices, it is strange to see municipal administrations sell public lands to big developers. Every year Indonesian cities see new giant malls, but hardly a new public park. Money talks and big business gets the land, but poor SV/PKL need space too. It is time for urban planners to design public spaces accessible for PKL, so that they are not forced to encroach on pedestrian walks and roadways. It is also time for public administrators to respect those plans.

V. Conclusion

The “problem” of static street vendors or PKL is a problem besieging cities in all LDC. It is part of a larger problem, the over-urbanization of LDC cities, due to rural-urban migration. The cause of this migration varies, one of them is an urban development bias, where scarce resources are channeled to the cities, at the expense of rural economic development.

The informal sector, of which street vending is just one component, is a vessel that accommodates labor unemployable in the urban formal sector. As such it is not as much a problem as a solution. People need to revise their perception of the informal sector in general. Street vendors have a negative image in the view of congested urban road users and pedestrians crowded out from the sidewalks/pavements. As such people generally support local government efforts to sweep them off the streets. However repressive municipal policy toward street vendors (PKL), with the deployment of the Admin Police (Satpol PP), have been shown to be counterproductive. PKL exist because there is a market niche for them. They serve an economic purpose. As such they are productive. They are an urban asset. They deserve support, not only because they are part of the poor and the weak.

Sustainable support for SV/PKL (and for the informal sector in general) is only possible if there is a change of mindset among urban decision makers. Favorable perspectives are the foundation of good policy. It has been done successfully elsewhere, many times, and Indonesian city managers have many examples to study from. It is time for all of us to help transform PKL (street vendors) from city blight into a city attraction, where the poor and the unskilled can contribute productively to the society and the society supports them to grow into a legitimate formal business.

“Poverty is not created by poor people. It has been created by ... institutions ... and policies ...”

Muhammad Yunus, 2006 Nobel Peace Laureate

VI. References

Library research assistance provided by Sinta Wulansari, SE

- Amir Sidharta, 2006, "Katanye Kota Kaki Lima", Kompas, 8/2/06.
- Bagdja Muljarjadi, Rahmat, 2007, "Economic Valuation of Urban Informal Activities: Case Study of Flea Markets in Bandung Municipality", MET FE UNPAD, Bandung.
- Bandung.go.id, 2007, "Rakor Penertiban Pedagang Pasar Ciroyom ...", Website PemKot Bandung, 7/13/07.
- Benny D. Setianto, comments at at City Marketing International Conference, 8/25/07, Semarang
- Boeke dan Burger, 1973, "Ekonomi Dualistis : Dialog antara Boeke dan Burger", Bhatara, Jakarta.
- Bhowmik, 2003, "Hawkers and Urban Informal Sector : A Study of Street Vending in Seven Cities", NASVI (National Association of Street Vendors of India).
- Bodhikong & Moongjongklang, 2004, "Case Study Report : Problems and Possible Solutions for Stall Sellers and Street Vendors", Bangkok, Thailand.
- ILO (International Labor Organization), 1972, "ILO Report from Kenya".
- ILO, 2004, "Report of ILO-OAS Meeting in Washington, D.C.".
- ILO, 2005, "Informal Economy in the Americas : Current Situation, Policy Priorities and Good Practices".

ILO, 2006, "The Informal Economy, Labor Protection and Street Vending : Cambodia, India, Malaysia, Mongolia and Thailand", ILO Seminar, Bangkok, Thailand.

ILO, 2007, "Spicy Taste of Entrepreneurship : Street Food Sellers and Economic Development", ILO Report, Bangkok, Thailand.

Kompas, 2007, "PemKot Bagi-bagi Gerobak", 6/8/07, Jakarta.

Kompas, 2007, "PKL dan HUT DKI Jaya", Senin, 8/13/07, Jakarta.

Rina Indiasuti, dkk., 2007, "Survey PKL di Bandung", LP3E FE UNPAD.

Mubyarto, 2004, "Perekonomian rakyat Sudah Bangkit", Kompas, 3/8/04.

Mubyarto, 2004, "Capres/Wapres dan Ekonomi Rakyat", Jurnal Ekonomi Rakyat dan Reformasi Kebijakan, 7/04.

Nirathron, 2006, "Fighting Poverty from the Streets : A Survey of Street Vendors in Bangkok", ILO, Bangkok, Thailand.

Pikiran Rakyat, 2002, "PKL : Sumber Devisa yang Terabaikan", 11/4/02, Bandung.

Retno Susanti, comments at City Marketing International Conference, 8/25/07, Semarang

Rojiful Mamduh, 2007, "Kunci Sukses Jombang Berhasil Meraih Adipura", Kompas 8/6/07

Sutyastie Remi, dkk., 2003, "Analisis Ekonomi Jawa Barat", Unpad Press, Bandung

Todaro, 2005, "Development Economics", 5th ed., McGraw-Hill, Boston, MA.

Yunus, Muhammad, 2006 <<http://nobelprize.org>>

APPENDICES

STREET VENDING NOMENCLATURE PHOTOGRAPHS

- Mobile/Dynamic street vendor
 - Full mobile street vendor (“tanggul”)



- Partilally mobile streeet vendor(“tanggul”)



- **Static street vendor**
 - Cart



- Roll-out carpet



- Stand



(This photograph is taken from www.alesklar.worldpress.com)

Unemployment, Poverty and Income per capita in Indonesia

year	number of unemployment	Number of population under poverty line (urban&rural)	GDP per capita
	(peoples)	(peoples)	Rupiah
1988	2,078,000	30,000,000	3,431,258.61
1989	2,083,000	28,333,333	3,793,736.20
1990	1,952,000	28,133,333	4,050,607.54
1991	2,032,000	27,200,000	4,318,903.13
1992	2,186,000	26,266,667	4,440,281.35
1993	2,246,000	26,333,333	4,675,480.86
1994	3,738,000	25,900,000	4,911,966.50
1995	6,251,000	25,466,667	5,250,704.46
1996	4,408,000	34,500,000	5,646,692.05
1997	4,197,000	49,500,000	6,236,885.59
1998	5,063,000	48,400,000	5,941,168.49
1999	6,030,000	37,500,000	5,596,801.55
2000	5,813,000	38,700,000	6,751,580.23
2001	8,005,000	37,900,000	7,239,819.39
2002	9,132,000	38,400,000	7,069,282.26
2003	9,820,000	37,300,000	7,174,138.31
2004	10,251,000	36,100,000	7,417,782.96
2005	10,854,000		7,960,792.76
Sources	www.adb.org	www.bps.go.id	www.adb.org